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Abstract
Numerous studies have found a negative relationship between religiousness and IQ. 
It is in the region of − 0.2, according to meta-analyses. The reasons for this rela-
tionship are, however, unknown. It has been suggested that higher intelligence leads 
to greater attraction to science, or that it helps to override evolved cognitive dis-
positions such as for religiousness. Either way, such explanations assume that the 
religion–IQ nexus is on general intelligence (g), rather than some subset of special-
ized cognitive abilities. In other words, they assume it is a Jensen effect. Two large 
datasets comparing groups with different levels of religiousness show that their IQ 
differences are not on g and must, therefore, be attributed to specialized abilities. An 
analysis of the specialized abilities on which the religious and non-religious groups 
differ reveals no clear pattern. We cautiously suggest that this may be explicable in 
terms of autism spectrum disorder traits among people with high IQ scores, because 
such traits are negatively associated with religiousness.
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Introduction
Since the 1920s (e.g. Gilkey 1924; Howells 1928), a substantial number of stud-
ies have found a weak but consistent negative relationship between religiousness 
and IQ. Meta-analyses have shown that this relationship is in the region of − 0.2 
in the general population, and around − 0.1 among college students (e.g. Zuck-
erman et  al. 2013; Dutton 2014). Similar negative correlations are also found 
between religiousness and diverse proxies for IQ, such as educational level and 
income (Meisenberg et al. 2012). The association is greater at the level of coun-
tries, with estimates of national average IQ being correlated with national aver-
age levels of religiosity at about − 0.6 (Lynn and Vanhanen 2012). The negative 
religiousness–IQ nexus is found within most countries, with only a small num-
ber of exceptions (Meisenberg et  al. 2012). The association can be found both 
among young and elderly samples (Ritchie et  al. 2014). The more pronounced 
in its religiosity a group is, the lower the average IQ its members tend to possess 
(Lewis et  al. 2011; Nyborg 2009), whereas members of high IQ organizations, 
such as the Royal Society, tend to be overwhelmingly atheist (Larsen and Witham 
1998). The evidence for a negative association between religiousness and IQ is 
thus robust.
The precise causes of this relationship are less clear. Nyborg (2009) argues that 
people are attracted to different ways of understanding the world based on their 
ability to deal with complexity. Science is too complex for those with lower intel-
ligence, who therefore resort to the simpler explanations and life-guiding rules 
that religions typically provide. Dutton (2014) suggests that the elevated reason-
ing ability entailed by higher intelligence fosters the ability to see through what 
he regards as the fallacious arguments for the existence of God, and to therefore 
conclude that there is no God in the absence of supporting evidence. Kanazawa’s 
(2012) Savanna–IQ Interaction hypothesis rests on the assumption that our ances-
tors were most strongly adapted to the ecology of the Savannah. Accordingly, 
this is our ‘evolutionarily familiar’ environment, because, having spent so long 
in it, this ecology selected certain evolved modules useful for dealing with the 
recurrent problems found in that ecology. One  set of modules that this ances-
tral environment selected for might have been those associated with the genera-
tion of social behaviors undergirding religiousness. As humans left the Savan-
nah, they began to encounter evolutionarily novel problems that these modules 
could not solve, and developed higher intelligence that could successfully solve 
these novel problems. Thus, intelligence became associated with ‘evolutionarily 
novel preferences’, such as atheism. There are several conceptual and empirical 
problems with this hypothesis, highlighted by Dutton and van der Linden (2017). 
One is that evolution continued, and maybe even accelerated, during the Holo-
cene (Cochran and Harpending 2009; Woodley of Menie et al. 2017) which the 
Savanna–IQ Interaction hypothesis assumes is not the case. Dutton and van der 
Linden (2017) proposed the Intelligence Mismatch Association Model. It sug-
gests that one aspect of intelligence is the ability to rise above our evolved cog-
nitive biases, as this allows us to better solve new cognitive problems by being 
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more open to unusual potential solutions. The difference between the original 
Savanna–IQ Interaction hypothesis and the Intelligence Mismatch Association 
model is that the latter applies to any evolved behavioural or cognitive repertoire, 
thereby avoiding the alleged subjective distinction between ‘evolutionarily novel’ 
and ‘evolutionarily familiar’ problem content. Dutton and van der Linden’s argu-
ment is simply that humans have certain cognitive biases, intelligence is asso-
ciated with rising above them in order to solve problems more flexibly, and as 
religious belief is a cognitive bias, intelligence should be negatively associated 
with it.
However, all these models assume that the negative religion–IQ nexus is predom-
inantly related to general intelligence (g), as they all assume that religious people 
are less intelligent than atheists. The g factor is likely the construct that best repre-
sents the heritable components of intelligence, and hence that which evolution has 
most strongly acted upon historically in human, and more broadly, primate popula-
tions, as indicated by comparative phylogenetic analyses of the evolutionary rates 
for different cognitive abilities, where there are strong indications that such rates 
increase in proportion to the loading of these abilities onto a Big-G factor of inter-
specific cognitive ability (Fernandes et al. 2014). An IQ test score is typically the 
sum of several subtests that measure specific cognitive abilities and will therefore 
include these specific abilities. A proper measure of g should rather ignore the spe-
cific abilities, but capture the variance that is common among them. This is achieved 
by factor analysis, the first unrotated factor of which typically explains 50–60% of 
the variance among all subtests across a number of individuals. Factor analysis also 
yields  the factor loadings for each subtest, corresponding to the proportion of the 
common variance between the subtest and g, referred to as its g loading (Jensen 
1998). The Jensen effect refers to a situation in which subtest g-loadings positively 
moderate a given effect size, indicating that g variance is the source of that effect 
size. Jensen effects manifest as positive correlations between the column vector of 
the effect sizes associated with each subtest (e.g. the strength of a subtest’s correla-
tion with religiosity) and the column vector of  their associated g loadings (Jensen 
1998). The present study asks specifically whether the negative religion–IQ nexus is 
a Jensen effect. Finding that it is not (indeed it is an anti-Jensen effect), it explores 
possible explanations for the existence of this nexus, leading us to examine the role 
of autism spectrum traits.
Method
To address the research question, we reanalysed two large datasets which looked at 
the relationship between religiousness and IQ in such a way that differences on g 
could be discerned: Verhage (1964), who employed a student sample, and a dataset 
presented in Steppan (2010). Both studies were analysed in Steppan (2010), who 
compared IQ scores, and tested for Jensen effects, in Protestant versus Catholic 
regions, in order to examine the Protestant Ethic (the high socioeconomic achieve-
ment of Protestants relative to Catholics). In contrast to Steppan, we went back to 
Verhage (1964) and included non-church members in our analysis. We first perform 
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a Jensen effect analysis, using data from a number of previous studies. In general, g 
loadings were computed by conducting a principal-axis factor analysis on the cor-
relation matrix of a test battery’s subtest scores. The subtests’ loadings on the first 
unrotated factor indicate the subtest’s loading on g. These g loadings were always 
matched to the age range of the groups involved in the comparison as closely as 
possible. If the age range of the comparison groups comprised more than one age 
group of the IQ battery, then weighted average g loadings were computed for all 
age groups of the IQ battery that fell within the age range of the comparison groups. 
Difference scores (d) were computed by taking the higher-scoring religious group’s 
mean IQ score and subtracting the mean IQ score of the lower-scoring religious 
group, and dividing by the pooled SD. Finally, Pearson correlations between the col-
umn vectors of the d scores and g loadings were computed. This correlation yields 
a moderation statistic, indicating the degree to which subtest g saturation moderates 
the associated effect size (d) in question (if at all).
Corrections for Artefacts
Psychometric meta-analytical techniques (Hunter and Schmidt 1990) were applied 
using the software package developed by Schmidt and Le (2004). Those techniques 
are based on the principle that there are statistical artefacts in every dataset and that 
most of these artefacts can be corrected. In this case, we carried out a bare-bones 
meta-analysis, where we corrected for only one artefact, namely sampling error, 
which in the present study is reflected in the number of subtests in the IQ battery 
used. An IQ battery with 4 subtests has more sampling error than an IQ battery with 
25 subtests.
Choice of SD
For computing standardized effect sizes (d), from the mean differences between 
groups, the best estimate of SD available was used. Our choice of SDs, is, in order of 
preference (1): the SD of a national standardization sample; (2) the SD of a control 
group; and (3) a weighted average of the SD of the groups involved in the compari-
son. As neither the first or second option was available, the weighted average SD was 
used, computed as the pooled SD: pooled SD = √(((N1 − 1)*SD12 + (N2 − 1)*SD22)/
(N1 + N2 − 2)) for two samples. For three samples, the pooled SD formula changes to 
pooled SD = √(((N1 − 1)*SD12 + (N2 − 1)*SD22 + (N3 − 1)*SD32)/(N1 + N2 + N3 − 3)). 
For four or more samples, the formula changes in the same manner. When the sam-
ples have the same N, the pooled SD is equal to the ordinary average of the SDs 
(Agresti and Franklin 2007).
Lack of Independence of Data Point in the Meta‑Analytical Database
A potential problem for our study is that we use all datasets repeatedly for com-
parisons, which creates dependency between the data points. For instance, the 
Protestants are compared to the Catholics, but also to the non-religious. This is not 
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optimal, because the software for meta-analysis assumes independence between the 
datasets.
An element of what is bothersome about using a dataset twice for a comparison 
is that peculiarities of that dataset will have an unwanted influence on two compari-
sons, so that the chance becomes smaller that this specific peculiarity is cancelled 
out by the other data points.
In most cases, an individual dataset in a meta-analysis has quite a bit of sampling 
error, because it is not a perfect sample from the population. However, in the case 
of the Dutch data, which make up most of the meta-analytical database, the GALO 
data were representative of the Dutch population and the subsamples were also quite 
representative for their specific religious group. So, an important element of lack 
of independence of datasets is that the samples used in a study show quite a bit of 
sampling error and may differ quite a bit from a representative sample. However, our 
religious samples are pretty representative of their respective populations, so there 
does not seem to be a significant problem with dependence of the Dutch samples.
Our approach to dependence of samples leans strongly on the approach by te 
Nijenhuis et al. (2016), who wrote:
“Schmidt and Hunter (2015, p. 437) state that when discussing dependence 
of samples, a distinction has to be made between arguments from statistical 
theory, and empirical outcomes of the strength of effects. According to statisti-
cal theory, if a small sample contributes a very large number of data points, 
then this may lead to undercorrection for sampling error in the meta-analysis. 
However, if the number of effect sizes contributed by each study is small in 
comparison to the total number of effect sizes then there is little error in the 
resulting accumulation …”
In the present study, each Dutch religious group is present in three out of seven 
comparisons, which is a clear indication of dependence in the database. However, 
none of the groups is small (Catholics: N = 666; Dutch Reformed Church: N = 460; 
Reformed Church Service: N = 148; and non-member of Church: N = 264), so there 
does not seem to be a problem. te Nijenhuis et al. (2016), also write:
“Several studies focused on the empirical question of how serious the prob-
lems created by violations of independence are in real data (see Bijmolt and 
Pieters 2001; Taveggia 1974; and Tracz et  al. 1992). Schmidt and Hunter 
(2015, p. 452) conclude that the distortion caused by dependent samples is 
probably negligible.”
Taking all arguments into consideration, we decided to not correct for the at worst 
slight dependence in the samples.
 Journal of Religion and Health
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Results
The results of the studies on the correlation between g loadings and the score dif-
ferences between different religious groups in the Netherlands—Catholics, Prot-
estants, and non-religious—which have been shown to have different average IQs 
are shown in Table 1. The Protestant–Catholic division was motivated by previous 
studies clearly showing more nuanced levels of the religious/non-religious spec-
trum between these groups. Catholics, as a group, have consistently been found to 
be more religious, in terms of observance and belief, than Protestants in denomi-
nationally mixed nations as well as having lower average IQ or education levels as 
observed in England, Ireland, the USA, the Netherlands, and when comparing Prot-
estant and Catholic areas in Europe (Pike 1869; Verhage 1964; Fichter 1952; Gorer 
1955; Nyborg 2009; Meisenberg et  al. 2012; Lynn and Vanhanen 2012). Table  1 
reports data derived from one study, with participants numbering 10,497. It also lists 
the reference for the study, the specific groups being compared, cognitive ability test 
Table 1  Vector correlations between subtest g loadings and score differences (d) between different reli-
gious groups
Ntotal = total sample size; r = correlation d × g. The total sample size for the Verhage study is 1538
GIT Groninger intelligentie test [Groningen test of intelligence], EMS Eignungstest für das Medizin-
studium [aptitude test for medical studies]
The mean IQs for the Dutch religious groups are: Roman Catholic 97.95, Dutch Reformed Church 99.85, 
Reformed Church Service 100.55, and Non-members of Church 103.80. The mean IQs for the Swiss reli-
gious groups are: Catholics 98.56 and Protestants 100.46
Reference Comparison Test Nsubtests r Ntotal
Verhage (1964) Roman Catholic—Dutch Reformed Church GIT 10 − .57 544
Roman Catholic—Reformed Church Service GIT 10 .28 242
Roman Catholic—Non-members of Church GIT 10 − .49 378
Dutch Reformed Church—Reformed Church Service GIT 10 .80 224
Dutch Reformed Church—Non-members of Church GIT 10 − .09 335
Reformed Church Service—Non-members of Church GIT 10 − .61 190
Steppan (2010) Roman Catholics—Protestants EMS 9 − .22 8,959
Table 2  Exploratory bare-bones data synthesis results for vector correlations between subtest g loadings 
and score differences (d) between different religious groups
Bare-bones data synthesis  results: score differences between different religious groups  (d), and  subtest 
g loadings. K = number of data points; Ntotal = total sample size; mean r = mean of observed correlations 
corrected for sampling error; SDr = standard deviation of observed correlations; %VE = percentage of 
variance accounted for by sampling errors. The total sample size does not change when the outlier is left 
out, as the two groups in the comparison are still used for other comparisons
Analysis K Ntotal Mean r SDr %VE
All 7 10,497 − .13 .33 47.1
Minus outlier 6 10,497 − .28 .31 95.5
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used, number of subtests in the IQ battery, vector  correlation between g loadings 
and d, and the total sample size for the comparison of two religious groups. At first 
sight, the vector  correlations between the subtests’ g loadings and the differences 
between the groups (in d) show no clear pattern with regard to magnitude and sign. 
Table  2 presents the results of the bare-bones data synthesis  of the seven data 
points. It shows the number of vector correlation coefficients (K), total sample size 
(Ntotal), and the mean vector  correlation and its standard deviation (SDr). The last 
column presents the percentage of variance explained by sampling errors (%VE). 
The analysis of all seven data points yielded an estimated  aggregated vector  cor-
relation of − .13, with a relatively modest 47.1% of the variance in the observed 
correlations explained by sampling errors. It is clear that the comparison between 
the Dutch Reformed Church and Reformed Church Service is a statistical outlier 
with its very high value of r = .80. These two groups differ only .70 of an IQ point, 
which means their mean IQ scores are almost identical, supplying a good argument 
for leaving this data point out of the meta-analysis. The analysis of the remaining six 
data points yielded an estimated vector correlation of − .28 and now virtually all the 
variance between the data points is explained by sampling error (95.5). This means 
that the differences between religious groups are clearly not Jensen effects (this is in 
fact an anti-Jensen effect).
The study on the relationship between IQ profiles of different religious groups 
and general intelligence was based on a very large sample size and yielded a small 
negative vector correlation, which clearly is not a Jensen effect. We therefore con-
clude that specialized cognitive abilities and test specificities may play a prospec-
tively larger role in moderating the observed ability differences than g, when ethni-
cally close-matched populations are used.
Given that the finding of an anti-Jensen effect seems to indicate that the differ-
ences between the groups are not on g, the key question is ‘What subtests may drive 
the intelligence differences?’ In Tables 3 and 4, the results of the subtests are pro-
vided. These results do not show a consistent pattern. In the Verhage (1964) study, 
the largest effect sizes are found on those tasks that involved naming animals and 
professions, and on word list, which seem to suggest that the subgroup differences 
depend particularly on vocabulary or verbal abilities. In the Steppan (2010) study, 
the largest group differences in the expected direction were on mental rotation and 
medical–scientific reasoning. The former, in particular, strongly relies on spatial 
abilities. Yet, there was a negative effect on mathematical ability. 
Discussion
We tested the assumption inferred from the theories discussed in the introduction 
that the relationship between IQ differences between religious groups with differ-
ent average IQs and their g loadings constitutes a Jensen effect, and may therefore 
indicate a role for g as a source of positive moderation of the group differences. As it 
clearly does not, when members of the same ethnic group are compared, evolution-
ary theories that purport to explain the weak, but robust negative religiousness–IQ 
nexus become somewhat less convincing. We would have expected, therefore, that 
 Journal of Religion and Health
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a specific pattern of specialized cognitive abilities would have driven the negative 
religious–IQ nexus. However, contrary to our expectations, the analyses of the sub-
tests differences did not reveal a clear pattern with regard to which specific cogni-
tive abilities may drive the IQ differences between the different groups. In Verhage 
(1964), the largest differences seemed to occur on vocabulary. In the Steppan (2010) 
study, the subtest effect sizes showed less variation than in the Verhage study, but 
the largest effect sizes in the expected direction were found on mental rotation and 
medical–scientific reasoning. In the Steppan (2010) sample, the presumably more 
religious group did relatively better on mathematical reasoning.
A possible way of making sense of our findings is through the influence of autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD). There is a growing body of research on the negative rela-
tionship between ASD and religiosity. The evidence indicates, overall, that ASD is 
negatively associated with religious belief and that empathy is the mediating factor: 
autism, in part, may actually cause people to be less religious (see the  systematic 
literature review by Dutton et al. 2018). Caldwell-Harris et al. (2011) studied discus-
sions by 192 different contributors on an autism website, from which they were able 
to discern the views on religion held by the contributors. High-functioning autistic 
(HFA) individuals significantly demonstrated the highest rates of ‘non-belief identi-
ties’: Atheism (26%) and Agnosticism (17%). In the neurotypical (NT) group used as 
non-autistic controls, 17% were atheists and 10% were agnostics. The same authors 
conducted a survey with a sample of 61 people who self-identified as autistic. They 
found that those who regarded themselves as atheists scored significantly higher 
than those who were believers did on the Autism Quotient Scale, an instrument that 
quantifies the extent of autism. Barnes and Gibson (2013) found that those who had 
undergone religious experiences had elevated empathy, contrary to those with ASD. 
Jack et  al. (2016) found that ‘moral concern’, which is also conceivably lower in 
those with ASD, predicted strength of religious belief and was negatively associ-
ated with analytic thinking. This implies that low religiousness is predicted by ana-
lytic thinking—which those with ASD are particularly adept at. Norenzayan et al. 
(2012) showed that autism predicted reduced religious belief, based on Canadian 
and American samples. Importantly, they found that it was the ability to mentalize 
that mediated the negative relationship between autism and religious belief. Lowicki 
Table 4  Subtest differences between Catholics and Protestants in Steppan (2010)
Subtest Catholics Protestants SD (pooled) d g Loading
Find mistakes 98.56 100.46 10 .14 .74
Verbal memory 10.94 11.36 2.96 .15 .60
Figural memory 11.05 11.64 3.85 .15 .73
Mental rotation 12.20 12.71 3.36 .21 .60
Mathematical abilities 12.18 12.92 3.59 − .18 .73
Charts and tables 10.67 10.01 3.61 .15 .15
Medical–scientific reasoning 9.99 10.51 3.51 .19 .74
Text comprehension 10.15 10.78 3.35 .16 .72
Attention test 8.72 9.26 3.36 .10 .43
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and Zajenkowski (2016, 2017) and Vonk and Pitzen (2017) note that aspects of 
ASD—such as low emotional intelligence—are negatively associated with religious 
belief. Again, these are the aspects of ASD that relate to the ability to develop a 
sound theory of mind. The only counter-study of which we are aware is Reddish 
et al. (2016), which did not find any significant difference in religious behaviour or 
belief between an HFA group and an NT control group. However, this was based on 
a very small sample of 21 people.
So, all available studies with reasonable sample sizes are consistent with the 
notion that theory of mind is an important factor in the association between ASD 
and religious belief. Autistics tend to perceive the world in a mechanistic fashion, 
as a system. Accordingly, they should not perceive the complexity of the world as 
the workings of a sentient being, because they are unable to think about or even 
notice mental states. In this regard, they stand in stark contrast with schizotypal 
personality. Schizophrenia (a particularly pronounced manifestation of schizotypal 
personality) is associated with being extremely religious, as well as with belief in 
the paranormal and in conspiracy theories (see Dutton et al. 2018). This is because 
schizophrenics are so highly attuned to inferring mental states from external mark-
ers that they perceive evidence of mental states even in the world itself; it is as if the 
world has feelings and meaning; thus, schizophrenics routinely experience the pres-
ence of God. There are a variety of models which have attempted to make sense of 
religious experiences or the feeling that there is a god. Azari et al. (2005) used brain 
scans to conclude that religious experience is primarily a cognitive phenomenon 
rather than an emotional one. Religious experience, they concluded, relates to neu-
ral processes involved in ‘relational cognitivity’—thinking about relationships. Sch-
joedt et al. (2009) assessed which areas of the brain were active when participants 
engaged in informal prayer compared to when wishing to Santa Claus. They found 
that brain activity during prayer more closely resembled that which occurred while 
talking to a real person than to an imaginary figure. Religious experience appears to 
involve the ability to empathize with somebody else. Although it is currently small, 
the extant brain imaging evidence indicates that religious experience involves brain 
areas that are associated with mentalizing and relating to other people.
This raises the question of how people with ASD perform in IQ tests. There is 
no clear direction to these results. A literature review by Ghaziuddin and Mountain-
Kimchi (2004) reported that some studies have found that those with Asperger’s 
syndrome—a middle-level ASD—have high-level verbal IQ and but can be deficient 
on performance IQ. Other studies have revealed that those with pronounced ASD, 
such as high-functioning autism, show a reversal in this pattern: poor verbal IQ and 
high mathematical IQ. Consistent with this, Karpinski et  al. (2018) have recently 
presented evidence that highly intelligent people seem to manifest autism traits, in 
terms of an enhanced tendency to systematize and a diminished ability to empathize 
(see also Baron-Cohen 2002 and Crespi 2016). Tests of the IQ of HFA persons have 
found that their scores are high in fluid intelligence, in other words on matrix and 
similarities reasoning subtests (e.g. Hayashi et al. 2008). Dawson et al. (2007) have 
shown that HFA persons score strongly on Raven’s (a matrix test) relative to broader 
IQ test batteries, on average 30 percentile points, and in some cases 70 percentile 
points higher than they score on the WISC. However, it is not high-functioning 
1 3
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autism (HFA) which predicts low religiosity but rather ASD more broadly, and here 
the IQ profile pattern is much less clear cut. In this regard, a recent study found that 
possessing genetic risk factors for ASD was associated with logical memory, verbal 
intelligence and g, meaning it would confer a small advantage in IQ tests even in the 
absence of greater g (Clarke et al. 2016). So, such an explanation would potentially 
make sense of the otherwise difficult to explain results which we find. However, 
more research must be conducted to discover why we did not find any positive mod-
erating effect of g. Our finding that the more religious scored better on Mathematics 
would seem to be consistent with the results of some studies which have found defi-
ciencies on performance IQ among those with ASD.
It should be cautioned that it is likely that the findings of our analysis only hold 
for within-population comparisons, where the differences in g might be expected to 
be relatively small. If we were to make comparisons between populations, such as 
between Middle Eastern Muslims and European Catholics, it is probable that, in line 
with Spearman’s hypothesis, the differences would indeed be on g. Moreover, inso-
far as the groups that are being compared in the present study may not be precisely 
equal in terms of g, there is room for small group differences in g to attenuate the 
anti-Jensen effect which we have found. But, naturally, it would be very difficult to 
find two groups that were precisely equal in terms of g. A second limitation is that 
our results are not comprehensive. However, there are two substantial datasets and, 
for this reason, our results are likely to generalize to religious differences in other 
countries. A third limitation is that the Steppan dataset makes comparisons between 
regions rather than individuals or groups, which leaves room for anomalies. Finally, 
it is worth cautioning that our ASD explanation for apparent oddities in our results is 
paralleled by similar anomalies in terms of the IQ profile of those with normal range 
IQ who have an ASD ranging all the way up to HFA. This may lead us to question 
the conceptual validity of ASD, or how accurately we can measure it, something 
which others have already done (e.g. Lundqvist and Lindner 2017; Ghaziuddin and 
Mountain-Kimchi 2004).
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